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1. INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment plays an important role in practice when firms decide whether or not to
undertake foreign direct investment (FDI). Modern FDI theories with firm heterogeneity,
however, consider predominately the tradeoff between fixed and variable costs of FDI; anal-
yses on how risk affects firms’ FDI decisions are generally absent. This paper aims to fill
this gap.
When firms contemplate FDI in a relatively backward Southern country, they face the
risk of failure in product quality control. The higher the technology content of their pro-
duction blueprints, the more complicated their production processes and the higher the
risk of quality control failure. In certain industries, such risk consideration may outweigh
the conventional cost consideration and eliminate all FDI in a candidate Southern coun-
try. Economist (2004) documented examples where some high-tech Japanese firms chose to
maintain their production at home; in other cases, they reverted their FDI decisions and
forwent their overseas operations in place when the negative effect of quality control failure
turned out to be detrimental. More anecdotal examples and supporting empirical findings
are provided in Section 2.
We introduce the risk of quality control failure into the Melitz-model with firm hetero-
geneity, and further incorporate learning by doing in a dynamic setting. Building on the
three pillars—risk, learning, and dynamics, our model modifies the predictions of standard
FDI models on the sorting pattern of firms, rationalizes the underlining goals of important
FDI policies, and proposes a theory on the two-way interaction between FDI and the South’s
development level.
Specifically, the incorporation of risk consideration implies an upper limit on the tech-
nology content of FDI, in addition to the lower cutoff predicted by the conventional model:
given that the risk of FDI is not prohibitive, only firms of ‘intermediate’ production tech-
nology content find FDI profitable. The determination of the lower cutoff for FDI is largely
based on the conventional tradeoff between fixed and variable costs, as firms in the lower
range of technology spectrum face minimal risks of quality control failure. The risk consid-
eration, however, weighs in the determination of the upper bound when the quality control
failure becomes a binding concern. While hosting multinational production is believed as
an important channel for international technology spillover, which helps propel the South’s
march on its ladder of technology frontier, the aforementioned upper bound confines the
base for learning and casts a limit on the technology frontier that the South can achieve
through inward FDI. It is with the attempt to relax these upper bounds (but not the lower
bounds, as inadvertently follows from the conventional model), we argue, are many govern-
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ment FDI policies and interventions created. See for example, the industrial parks for IT
in China1 and for biotechnology in Singapore.2 The model’s dynamic process of learning by
doing then implies a reinforcing interaction between FDI and the improvement of the South’s
technology frontier, with the endogenous evolution of FDI risk fueling the interaction. This
result suggests a long-run magnified policy impact, which would be overlooked in a static
framework.
We elaborate on the three model elements below. First, borrowing from the idea of
the O-ring theory of Kremer (1993), we assume that the risk of quality control failure by
producing in the South increases with the technology gap between the South’s technology
capacity and the level demanded by the firm from the North. Although a firm with a more
advanced technology gains more from the cheap labor in the South compared with a lower-
technology firm, such an advantage is weakened by the higher likelihood of FDI failure. This
offsetting factor can be strong enough to completely wipe out a firm’s incentive to invest
in the South. Risk consideration thus creates an upper limit on the technology content of
FDI. It also implies that the South’s technology frontier must meet a minimum threshold to
induce positive amounts of FDI inflow, as all firms may be discouraged by such a negative
risk effect if the technology capacity in a Southern country is too low.
Second, we model the learning process in the spirit of Matsuyama (2002). Specifically,
the South improves its technology capacity through accumulated experience in producing
for multinational firms. The more the accumulated experience, the further the South will
push ahead its technology frontier. However, the extent of technology spillover is bounded
by the host country’s absorptive capacity, which may hinge on the South’s human capital,
R&D intensity, IPR standard and enforcement, and its cultural and geographical distance
to the North. This helps explain why the gains in technology transfer from the presence of
FDI may vary across South.
Third, the dynamic interaction between FDI inflows and the improvement of the South’s
technology frontier leads to an agglomeration phenomenon of FDI as follows. Given the
South’s initial technology frontier exceeds the minimum threshold, the first wave of FDI
inflow takes place. This first wave helps the South build up production experience and kicks
off the momentum to push forward its technology frontier. As the frontier moves out, the
probability of FDI success rises and this in turn relaxes the constraint facing firms previously
keeping their production in the North. Consequently, it triggers a second wave of FDI led by
technologically more advanced firms. The larger production mass then pushes the South’s
technology frontier out further, relaxes the risk constraint, and triggers another wave of FDI
1http://www.globalmanufacture.net/home/IndustrialLocation/index.cfm
2http://www.edb.gov.sg/edb/sg/en uk/index/industry sectors/pharmaceuticals /industry background.html
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bringing with it even more advanced levels of technology. This dynamic process continues
until it converges to a steady state.
It is interesting to note that the set of steady states is a lattice, and the momentum
propelling the South’s technology frontier stops at the least element of the lattice. That is,
if there are multiple steady states, the South is trapped into the lowest steady state with a
relatively low level of technology frontier. This result offers two valuable policy implications.
First, being the first mover in opening up to FDI guarantees only an earlier start of the
learning process but not a higher level of development in the long-run; it is the South’s
initial technology capacity that determines the path of technology progress and the eventual
development level. Second, an FDI policy by the South could actually pull the South out of
the development trap toward one of the higher steady-state development levels.
We work out the effects of several important parameters on the values of the technology
frontier in the South, the FDI stock, and the bounds for the technology content of inward
FDI at the steady state. These encompass infrastructure parameters (the South’s initial
technology frontier and its absorptive capacity), cost parameters (the wage in the South and
the fixed setup cost of FDI), and industry-specific technology parameters (the degree of risk
sensitivity and the degree of input substitution). These exercises clarify the mechanisms
through which many FDI policies operate and highlight the potential persistent impact of
one-time industrial policies on development as their initial effects are reinforced through the
endogenous dynamic process.
Our paper contributes additional insights to the literature on the timing of FDI. Antra`s
(2005) applies incomplete contract theory and shows that FDI occurs in the later period of
the product life cycle, as the holdup problem is less a concern when production becomes more
standardized. McDonald and Siegel (1986), and the subsequent studies surveyed by Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), develop the option-theory approach to study the relationship between the
timing of irreversible FDI and uncertainty. Most of the analyses study the timing decision of
a single firm. By assumption, new information on market conditions reveals as time goes by.
As a direct result, higher uncertainty over the potential FDI profitability leads to a greater
option value, and waiting is therefore more valuable. Our model considers a continuum of
firms with heterogeneous production technologies. The risk of FDI failure facing each firm
remains at the same level over time unless the host country’s technology frontier improves,
which is a result of positive externality generated by the firms already operating in the South;
moreover, the risk prevails unless the South’s technology frontier exceeds the level required
by the production technology. Thus, there is a non-zero measure of firms that are deterred
from undertaking FDI at the steady state.
Our paper modifies the predictions of Findlay (1978) on the relationship between the
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gap of the North-South development levels and the dynamics of FDI inflows. Findlay (1978)
hypothesizes that the South catches up faster, the more backward its development level
is relative to the North and the more exposed it is to FDI; moreover, the further behind
the South’s development level is, the more unexploited opportunity there exists and the
more FDI inflows it will attract. Although we support the argument that inward FDI
is an important channel through which the less developed countries acquire the advanced
technology developed abroad, by explicitly taking into account the FDI risk, our paper
changes two of his main predictions. First, we show that the development gap between the
South and the North has a negative effect on the amount of FDI inflows, as a larger gap
renders quality control more risky and FDI less profitable. Second, similar to Parente and
Prescott (1994) and Stokey (2009), we differentiate between the growth potential indicated
by the existing development gap and the realized growth that depends positively on the
South’s learning capacity. In our model, the South’s learning capacity depends on parameters
of human capital as well as experience in production for multinational firms. As a more
backward South attracts less FDI inflows, which in turn generates a slower buildup of learning
capacity, the initial technology backwardness of the South in our model has a negative and
magnified long-run effect on the South’s development.
Glass and Saggi (1998) have also studied the effect of the North-South technology gap on
the technology level of FDI, in a quality-ladder product cycle model. In particular, successful
imitation in the South helps close the North-South technology gap, and makes further FDI
with higher technology feasible. However, the causal effect is one way in the sense that
the presence of multinationals’ production generates no feedback to either the speed or the
extent of the catch up by the South, a mechanism highlighted in our paper. In Glass and
Saggi (1998), the South progresses automatically with the North’s innovation; thus, there is
no sustained development trap as may arise and be intervened by FDI policies in our model.
2. EMPIRICAL RELEVANCE
This section previews the important implications of our model and their empirical relevance.
In the model, we emphasize the higher risk that a firm with an advanced technology blueprint
may encounter if the production is carried out in the backward South instead of in the
North. In practice, anecdotal examples abound where a high-technology firm prefers to
keep its production at home in spite of the wage disadvantage. For example, Economist
(2004) reported that Kenwood of Japan shifted its production of mini-disc players from
Malaysia back to Yamagata, Japan in 2002, and witnessed its product’s defect rate to fall
by 80%. Similarly, Canon of Japan, with a high-tech product line (ranging from precision
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photocopiers, to optical components for digital cameras, to expensive equipment for making
semiconductors and flat-panel television screens) was observed to maintain a majority of its
worldwide production at home, and Sharp of Japan to open a new “sixth-generation” plant
to make flat panels for televisions in Mie prefecture, Japan in 2004, in the midst of rapid
movement of manufacturing by other Japanese firms to South Korea, Taiwan and China.
The effect of such risk consideration on firms of different technology levels is also vivid in
the examples cited in Makino et al. (2004). They found that among the Japanese electronic
consumer goods companies, Canon had the highest R&D rates and was the lowest of all in
its number of overseas subsidiaries in less developed countries relative to those in developed
countries. In contrast, Hitachi had half the R&D rate as Canon and a very high proportion of
overseas subsidiaries in less developed countries. Overall, parent firms investing in developed
countries had a higher average R&D rate than those investing in less developed countries. In
another study of Japanese manufacturing firms, Head and Ries (2003) also found that lower-
productivity firms tend to invest in lower-income host countries while higher-productivity
firms in higher-income host countries.
Our model suggests that inward FDI in an industry takes place only if the South’s tech-
nology frontier achieves a certain minimum threshold. Empirical studies of the determinants
of FDI location often lend support to this prediction of a threshold effect. See for example,
Kellenberg (2007), Fung et al. (2004), Globerman and Shapiro (2003), Wei (2000), Cheng
and Kwan (2000) among others. The model further shows that the required threshold level
of the South’s technology frontier is higher in industries with higher risk sensitivity. This
implication fits well with the empirical finding of a product-cycle (flying-geese) FDI pattern.
As documented in Feenstra and Rose (2000), more sophisticated industries often start pro-
duction in the more advanced countries before transferring to the less developed countries.
The model further implies that the flows of inward FDI in a newly opened South tend
to occur gradually, rather than in a “big-bang” fashion, through a learning-by-doing process
during which the uncertainty of producing in the host country is reduced and that triggers
subsequent inflows of FDI. This mechanism is a plausible cause for the dynamic agglom-
eration phenomenon observed by many empirical studies. For example, Head et al. (1995)
found that the location choice of FDI by Japanese firms in the U.S. is driven by the mass of
existing Japanese firms in the same industry. Similarly, Cheng and Kwan (2000) found that
FDI in China exhibits a strong self-reinforcing effect: existing FDI stock in a region tends
to attract further FDI inflows.
Our model also suggests that the extent of the learning-by-doing effect is positively related
to the leaning speed of the FDI host country. Empirical studies, such as Borensztein et al.
(1998), Alfaro et al. (2004), Balasubramanyam et al. (1996), and Durham (2004), have used
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different proxies for the learning speed and found that conditional on the amount of FDI
inflows, international technology transfer is more significant in host countries with better
absorptive capacity.
3. MODEL
3.1 Production Technology and Risk
Consider a world with two countries, the North and the South. Consumer preferences are
identical in the two countries and imply an isoelastic demand for a variety (good) i of an
industry j as
xj(i) = pj(i)
− 1
1−αj , 0 < αj < 1, (1)
where pj(i) is the price of variety i of industry j, and
1
1−αj corresponds to the price elasticity
of demand for each variety of industry j. We will often drop the variety and industry index
below to simplify presentations.
The production function for each variety in each industry is similar to that of the O-ring
theory (Kremer, 1993). In particular, production of a variety requires a continuum of steps
s ∈ [0, θ], where θ is the measure of intermediate steps to be performed. The magnitude of
θ thus reflects the complexity of the production technology. All steps must be performed
successfully for there to be valuable output and positive revenues; otherwise, the final good
is of no market value. That is,
x =

[∫ θ
0
λ(s)ρds
] 1
ρ
, in case of success;
0, in case of failure,
(2)
where λ(s) denotes the intensity of effort used to carry out step s; 0 < ρ < 1, and 1
1−ρ
corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between different steps, which can be different
across industries. The blueprints of all production technologies are developed and owned by
firms, who are located in the North. Each firm is associated with one type of production
technology θ, which is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(θ) with
θ ≥ 1.
It is assumed that labor is the only factor of production and that the wage rate in the
North wN is higher than the wage rate in the South wS. One unit of labor is required for
each unit intensity used to carry out a step regardless of the production location. Thus,
depending on the production location l, l ∈ {N,S}, a firm with a production technology θ
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chooses the intensity of intermediate steps to minimize its production cost as follows:
min
{λ(s), s∈[0,θ]}
∫ θ
0
wlλ(s)ds,
s.t.
[∫ θ
0
λ(s)ρds
] 1
ρ
≥ x.
The symmetry of the steps in their cost structure and in their contributions toward the final
output implies that λ(s) = λ = xθ−1/ρ, ∀s ∈ [0, θ]. Substituting λ(s) into the cost function,
one derives the minimized unit production cost as:
cl(θ) = wlθ
ρ−1
ρ , (3)
where ∂c
l(θ)
∂wl
> 0, ∂c
l(θ)
∂θ
< 0, and ∂c
l(θ)
∂ρ
> 0. Thus, the unit cost of production is lower if
the cost of labor input wl is lower, which explains the location advantage of producing in
the South. The unit cost is also lower if a firm uses more intermediate steps θ to produce a
good. Thus, the more sophisticated production technology a firm has, the more productive
it is. Finally, the unit cost is higher, if the tasks performed in different steps are more
substitutable, as it would require more intensive input λ in each step to produce a given
amount of output.
Note that the unit cost is incurred regardless of the quality of the output. A firm
only learns whether or not the output is marketable after the final good is produced. The
probability γl(θ) of completing all intermediate steps successfully for a given production
technology θ in a given production location l is assumed to take the following functional
form:
γN(θ) , 1, ∀ θ, where 1 ≤ θ, (4)
γS(θ) =
{
1, if 1 ≤ θ ≤ T S,(
TS
θ
)z
, if T S < θ,
(5)
where T S (T S ≥ 1) denotes the South’s technology frontier, and the parameter z (z ≥ 0) the
degree of risk sensitivity to the technology gap between the required production technology
θ and the South’s technology frontier T S (as measured by the reverse of T
S
θ
). Note that both
T S and z are industry-specific.
We assume that there is no risk of failure by producing in the North, for all blueprints
are developed in the North, and that there is no risk of failure by producing in the South if
the technology frontier of the South is ahead of the required level of the production blueprint
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(θ ≤ T S). In contrast, the risk of failure by producing in the South is present if the required
technology level of a firm is beyond the South’s technology frontier. The larger the technology
gap, the smaller the success probability of FDI production.
The above formulation embodies the general idea that the longer the production chain
θ and the more sophisticated the production technology, the more risky it is to produce
abroad. The argument for the positive correlation between the complexity of the blueprint
and the risk level of FDI is that carrying out the production abroad is more difficult if
completing the tasks requires intense and tacit communication. In our setup, if the blueprint
is more complicated and takes more steps to execute, the chance of misunderstanding during
information exchange and making mistakes in the production process increases with FDI
production.
The risk sensitivity z reflects the elasticity of the success probability to the technology
gap; the higher the degree of risk sensitivity z, the greater the negative effect of a given
technology gap on the success probability of FDI production. Particularly, the success prob-
ability approaches zero as z tends to infinity, and it approaches one as z reduces to zero.
The difference in the degrees of risk sensitivity across industries may be illustrated by the
contrast between the textile industry and the wafer fabrication industry, for example: an
accidental power failure will have much smaller impacts on the yields of a textile firm than
of a wafer fabrication firm.
In addition to unit production cost, firms of all technology levels also have to incur the
same fixed setup cost (in Northern labor units) to start the production. It is assumed that
the fixed setup cost is higher in the case of FDI, when the production is carried out in the
remote South, than in the firm’s home country North:
fN < fS.
It is also assumed that firms are risk neutral. Given the production location l, l ∈ {N,S}
and its production technology, a firm chooses the optimal output level that maximizes its
expected profit, taking into account the risk of production:
max
x
pil(θ) = γl(θ)xα − cl(θ)x− wNf l. (6)
The optimal output level is xl(θ) =
(
αγl(θ)
cl(θ)
) 1
1−α
, which decreases in the unit cost and increases
in the success rate of production. Note that both the unit cost (3) and the success rate of
production, (4) and (5), are location and technology dependent. The optimal output level
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can be further expressed as:
xN(θ) = ΩNθν , ∀ θ, where 1 ≤ θ, (7)
xS(θ) =
 Ω
Sθν , if 1 ≤ θ ≤ T S,
ΩS
(
TS
θ
) z
1−α
θν , if T S < θ,
(8)
where ν ≡
(
1−ρ
ρ
) (
1
1−α
)
> 0, and Ωl ≡ ( α
wl
) 1
1−α . Note that ΩN < ΩS. If there is no
FDI uncertainty, either due to z = 0 or θ ≤ T S, a firm with a more advanced blueprint
will command a larger market share, and FDI always induces production expansion. In
face of FDI risk, however, firms will cut back their outputs if producing in the South; this
offsetting effect is the larger, the more advanced a firm’s production technology is. The
optimal expected profit for firms with a blueprint θ producing in location l, l ∈ {N,S}, is
equal to:
piN(θ) = ψNθνα − wNfN , ∀ θ, where 1 ≤ θ, (9)
piS(θ;T S, z) =
 ψ
Sθνα − wNfS, if 1 ≤ θ ≤ T S,
ψS
(
TS
θ
) z
1−α
θνα − wNfS, if T S < θ, (10)
where ψl ≡ (1− α) (Ωl)α with ψN < ψS.
3.2 FDI Decision: To Stay or To Go?
A firm decides whether or not to undertake FDI by comparing piN(θ) and piS(θ;T S, z). The
decision is made by weighing the advantage of lower unit cost by producing in the South
against its disadvantage of higher fixed cost and higher risk of production failure. Such a
comparison is illustrated in Figure 1. For illustrative purposes, we have converted the scale
of production technology, where θ˜ = θνα and T˜ S ≡ (T S)να, and plotted the transformed
profit functions p˜iN(θ˜) and p˜iS(θ˜; T˜ S, z). The mapping between θ and θ˜ (or that between T S
and T˜ S) is a one-to-one, monotonic transformation; thus, we will often discuss results in the
original scale of production technology even as we refer to the figure. It is immediately clear
that p˜iN is a liner function and increasing in θ˜. By choosing to produce in the North, firms
face no risk of failure and their profit increases monotonically with the technology level.
On the other hand, the shape of p˜iS depends on z and T S, as shown by panels (a)-(d) in
Figure 1 with different combinations of risk sensitivity and technology frontier in the South.
We discuss each case in turn.
In the standard FDI literature, the risk of FDI failure is often assumed away. Examples
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include Antra`s and Helpman (2004) and Helpman et al. (2004). This corresponds to the
special case with z = 0 in our model and implies that the profit function of producing in
the South p˜iS is a linear schedule, as shown in panel (a) of Figure 1. We will refer to this
scenario as the risk-free case. To ensure that even in the risk-free case, some firms will still
produce in the North in face of FDI opportunity, the literature typically assumes:
Assumption 1 θN < θNS, where θN ≡
(
wNfN
ψN
) 1
να
, and θNS ≡
(
wN (fS−fN )
ψS−ψN
) 1
να
.
Note that θN corresponds to the technology level where a firm will break even by producing
in the North, and θNS the technology level where a firm will be indifferent between producing
in the North and in the South under the risk-free case. It follows that firms are partitioned
according to their technology levels into firms of the lowest technology levels, with θ ∈ [1, θN ],
who exit the market, firms of the lower technology levels, with θ ∈ [θN , θNS], who cannot
afford the higher fixed cost of FDI and produce in the North, and firms of the highest
technology levels, with θ ∈ [θNS,∞), who undertake FDI in the South.
This ‘single-crossing’ property of the risk-free case between the profit functions of pro-
ducing in the North and in the South has some undesirable implications. First, it implies
that firms of the highest technology levels are the ones to relocate production facilities to
the South. Second, any policies by the South aimed to enhance FDI incentives only serve
to attract more FDI by firms of marginally lower technology levels than the existing inward
FDI. Both predictions are contrary to what is observed in practice and what is aimed for by
governments when providing FDI subsidies. This critique in general applies to both vertical
and horizontal FDIs, as long as the FDI risk is not negligible.
More realistic and richer implications are obtained once FDI uncertainty is incorporated
into the standard model. The possible scenarios are illustrated in panels (b), (c), and (d)
of Figure 1. As suggested by (10), for a firm with a sufficiently low level of technology
(1 ≤ θ ≤ T S) such that it incurs no risk of production failure in the South, its expected
profit from FDI is increasing in its technology level; these firms face the same tradeoff of
fixed versus unit costs as in the risk-free case. For a firm with a relatively high level of
production technology (T S < θ), however, the saving in unit cost is further offset by the
higher risk of FDI production. The larger the technology gap, the larger is the offset in its
expected market size and profit of producing in the South relative to the risk-free case. Other
things being equal, the greater the risk sensitivity, the larger is also the offset in expected
market size and profit of producing in the South relative to the risk-free case for all firms
subject to the risk. Thus, the expected profit from FDI, p˜iS, is linear and increasing in θ˜
before T˜ S, coinciding with the risk-free case. It tilts down and becomes a concave function
after T˜ S, with the downward shift being larger for a higher level of risk sensitivity. Hence,
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the expected profit from FDI will eventually be dominated by the profit of producing in the
North for firms with sufficiently advanced technology. This implies an upper bound on the
technology level of inward FDI.
As will be shown formally in Proposition 1, FDI may not take place in the case where
the South’s technology frontier is relatively low, 1 ≤ T S ≤ θNS. For given T S in this range,
there exists a unique degree of risk sensitivity z∗ as a function of T S such that FDI occurs if
and only if the risk sensitivity is smaller than z∗. As shown in Figure 1(b), for z < z∗ where
the risk perception is relatively mild, positive amounts of FDI occur. The expected profit
function of FDI, p˜iS, crosses the profit function of producing in the North p˜iN twice, first from
below at θ0 and then from above at θ1. Firms are partitioned according to their technology
levels into those of the lowest technology levels, with θ ∈ [1, θN ], who exit the market, those
of relatively low and relatively high technology levels, with θ ∈ [θN , θ0] ∪ [θ1,∞), who stay
behind in the North, and those of the intermediate technology levels, with θ ∈ [θ0, θ1], who
undertake FDI.
Given firms that enter the market, for firms of relatively low technology levels θ ∈ [θN , θ0],
they face relatively low (or zero) probability of FDI failure; however, their market share is
so small that they do not gain enough in variable profit by shifting production to the South
to pay off the higher fixed setup cost of FDI. On the other hand, for firms of relatively high
technology levels θ ∈ [θ1,∞), they gain relatively more from the lower wage in the South;
however, their production technology levels are so advanced above the South’s frontier that
the higher likelihoods of FDI failure more than offset the wage saving. Thus, it is the firms
of intermediate technology levels that may find FDI profitable.
In Figure 1(c) with z∗ ≤ z and 1 ≤ T S ≤ θNS, the risk sensitivity perceived by firms
is so high that the wage advantage of producing in the South is more than offset by the
expected loss of production failure for all firms. The expected profit function of FDI, p˜iS,
lies everywhere below the profit function of producing in the North p˜iN , and as a result, no
firms find it profitable to relocate production to the South.
In the case where the South’s technology frontier is relatively high θNS < T
S as shown
in Figure 1(d), the expected profit function of FDI crosses the profit function of producing
in the North from below at θNS as in the risk-free case; it then crosses the profit function of
producing in the North again from above at a technology level θ1 greater than T
S. In this
case, the measure of inward FDI is necessarily positive.
The above discussion suggests an interplay between the South’s technology frontier and
the degree of risk sensitivity in determining the profitability of FDI in an industry. This is
characterized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 For any given level of initial technology frontier T S ∈ [1, θNS] in the South,
there exists a unique risk sensitivity ceiling z∗(T S), such that positive amounts of FDI take
place if and only if z < z∗(T S); for T S ∈ (θNS,∞), FDI occurs regardless of z. Alternatively,
for any given degree of risk sensitivity z, there exists a unique threshold T S∗(z) for the initial
technology frontier in the South, such that positive amounts of FDI take place if and only if
T S∗(z) < T S and that dT S∗(z)/dz ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. The schedule T S∗(z) partitions the (z, T S) param-
eter space into two areas — the upper-left area that implies a non-zero measure of FDI, and
the lower-right area that implies a zero measure of FDI. When the degree of risk sensitivity
is very small such that z ∈ [0, z∗(1)), FDI takes place regardless of the level of technology
frontier in the South: thus, T S∗(z) = 1. When the degree of risk sensitivity is very large such
that z ≥ z∗(θNS), the advantage of having a more advanced blueprint becomes a “curse”
when the blueprint is executed in the remote, backward South, as in this case, the net gain of
FDI is strictly decreasing in the firm’s technology level θ for θ > T S. This property implies
that if the firms with θ = T S find FDI not profitable, all firms exposed to FDI risk will find
FDI not profitable either. Therefore, no firm will find FDI desirable if T S ≤ θNS, where
recall that θNS is the cutoff type in the risk-free case. Thus, to ensure a non-zero measure
of FDI in this case, it must hold that T S > θNS: i.e., T
S∗(z) = θNS.
Note that the mapping from z ∈ [z∗(1), z∗(θNS)) to T S∗(z) outlined by the strictly
increasing curve CC ′ corresponds to the condition for a tangency between the South and
the North profit functions. Relative to the tangency condition, a higher T S or a lower z will
make FDI more profitable than producing in the North for some firms. Intuitively speaking,
if the industry is more risk-sensitive, the higher is the required minimum level of T S for a
non-zero measure of FDI to occur.
3.3 Extensive and Intensive Margins of FDI
If FDI takes place, let ΘS ≡ [θ0, θ1] denote the technology content of inward FDI. The upper
and lower bound of the technology content ΘS can be defined formally as follows:
piN(θ1) = pi
S(θ1;T
S, z), with piNθ (θ1) > pi
S
θ (θ1), (11)
piN(θ0) = pi
S(θ0;T
S, z), with piNθ (θ0) < pi
S
θ (θ0), (12)
where pilθ ≡ ∂pil/∂θ for l ∈ {N,S}. Note that the expected profit function of producing in the
South crosses the profit function of producing in the North from below at θ0 and from above
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at θ1, as indicated by Figure 1(b) and Figure 1(d), which gives rise to the signs claimed in
(11) and (12).
Recall that if the technology frontier in the South is sufficiently low such that it is lower
than the risk-free cutoff type θNS, the lower bound θ0 of the technology content of inward
FDI in the case with the risk factor will necessarily be higher than θNS, as the expected
profit of producing in the South is strictly lower than in the risk-free case. On the other
hand, when the technology frontier is sufficiently high and surpasses the risk-free cutoff type
θNS, the risk factor is no longer a constraint for firms with technology levels in between θNS
and T S, and all firms within this range behave as in the risk-free case and hence will produce
in the South; thus, in this case, the lower bound θ0 of the technology content of inward FDI
with the risk factor coincides with the risk-free cutoff type θNS.
Lemma 2 The upper bound θ1 of the technology content Θ
S of inward FDI increases, while
the lower bound θ0 of the technology content Θ
S of inward FDI decreases weakly, with the
South’s technology frontier T S:
∂θ1
∂T S
=
[
piNθ (θ1)− piSθ (θ1)
]−1
piSTS(θ1) > 0, (13)
∂θ0
∂T S
{
=
[
piNθ (θ0)− piSθ (θ0)
]−1
piSTS(θ0) < 0 if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
= 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(14)
where piSTS ≡ ∂piS/∂T S.
Proof of Lemma 2. Note that piNθ (θ1)− piSθ (θ1) > 0, piNθ (θ0)− piSθ (θ0) < 0, and piSTS > 0. The
first two signs thus follow. Next, note that θ0 = θNS regardless of T
S if θNS ≤ T S. The last
equality therefore follows.
Let XS ≡ χ(θ0, θ1, T S) denote the aggregate scale of production of the South for multi-
national firms in a given industry during a given period. Then,
χ(θ0, θ1, T
S) =
∫ θ1
θ0
xS(θ)dG(θ). (15)
Given (8), the aggregate scale of production of the South for multinational firms in a given
industry is
χ(θ0, θ1, T
S) =

∫ θ1
θ0
ΩS
(
T S
) z
1−α (θ)ν−
z
1−α dG(θ), if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
∫ TS
θ0
ΩSθνdG(θ) +
∫ θ1
TS
ΩS
(
T S
) z
1−α (θ)ν−
z
1−α dG(θ), if θNS ≤ T S.
(16)
14
We choose a Pareto distribution with shape k for the cumulative distribution function G(θ)
such that G(θ) = 1−(1/θ)k for θ ≥ 1 with k > ν. The last restriction on the shape parameter
k ensures that the aggregate output of all firms in any given period is finite regardless of
their production location even in the risk-free case. Given this, we have
χ(θ0, θ1, T
S) =

ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α
[
(θ0)
−a − (θ1)−a
]
, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
ΩSk
(k−ν)
[
(θ0)
−(k−ν) − (T S)−(k−ν)]
+ Ω
Sk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α
[(
T S
)−a − (θ1)−a] , if θNS ≤ T S,
(17)
where a ≡ z
1−α + k − ν > 0 under the parameter restriction for k and hence the aggregate
output in all scenarios are well defined.
Proposition 3 The aggregate scale of production of the South for multinational firms in a
given industry XS increases with the South’s technology frontier T S:
dXS
dT S
=
(
∂χ
∂θ0
∂θ0
∂T S
+
∂χ
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂T S
+
∂χ
∂T S
)
≡ Λ > 0. (18)
Proof of Proposition 3. It is straightforward to verify that ∂χ
∂θ0
< 0, ∂χ
∂θ1
> 0, and ∂χ
∂TS
> 0.
The result therefore follows by Lemma 2.
Note that the productionXS for multinational firms increases with the South’s technology
frontier T S at the rate Λ. This amount includes the increase in production for the existing
multinational firms because of the improved risk condition and expected profit ∂χ
∂TS
(an
intensive margin), as well as the increase in production due to new entrants ∂χ
∂θ0
∂θ0
∂TS
+ ∂χ
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂TS
(an extensive margin). Both margins work in the same direction to raise the aggregate scale
of production of the South for multinational firms with an improved technology frontier in
the South T S.
3.4 Learning by Doing
We model the catch up process of the South to improve its technology frontier in a similar
way in which Matsuyama (2002) models the learning process of an industry to upgrade
its productivity. That is, through accumulated productions specific to an industry, the
South gains experiences and its technology frontier in the industry improves. However,
such experiences do depreciate and the experiences of the more recent periods play a more
important role. Specifically, let QSt denote the stock of effective production experiences of
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the South in a given industry at period t:
QSt =
t∑
τ=0
(
1
1 + δD
)t−τ
δLX
S
τ , (19)
where δD > 0, δL > 0, and the periods start when the South just opens up to inward FDI so
that XS0 = 0. Note that the parameter δL corresponds to the learning speed of the South in
transforming the current production into production experiences. This learning speed likely
depends on the human capital of the labor force in the South or the intellectual property
rights (IPR) protection in the South. A more educated work force in the South is more
likely to better absorb the production technique and practice handed down from the firms
from the North and transform them into the South’s own stock of production know-how and
knowledge. A weaker IPR protection may also imply a faster rate of technology spillover
from the multinational firms to the local industry, which may explain to some extent the
South’s reluctance to tighten their IPR protection policies (Grossman and Lai, 2004). The
parameter δD, on the other hand, can be interpreted as the depreciation rate of the South’s
learning experiences. Workers move, retire, and die over time, and some learning experiences
are lost from one period to the next period. A larger δD corresponds to a smaller fraction
( 1
1+δD
) of learning experiences preserved from one period to the next period. The higher
the value of δL, the smaller the value of δD, the larger the stock of effective production
experiences. These experiences QSt translate into the technology frontier of the South T
S
t
through a learning function Γ(·). That is,
T St ≡ T S0 + Γ(QSt ), (20)
with the properties that Γ(0) = 0, ΓQ ≡ dΓ/dQS > 0, and limQS→∞ Γ(QS) → ∞. The
learning function implies that the South’s technology frontier in a given period will remain
at its initial level T S0 , if the initial level falls short of the minimum threshold stipulated in
Proposition 1 and as a result, inward FDI and the subsequent learning by the South do
not take place. Otherwise, the South’s technology frontier improves with the South’s accu-
mulated production experiences and approaches infinity if the stock of effective production
experiences tends to infinity.
3.5 The Dynamics of FDI
In any given period t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., firms face two state variables (QSt−1, T
S
t−1) and make FDI
decisions determining the values of three choice variables (θ0,t, θ1,t, X
S
t ). Given T
S
t−1 at the
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beginning of the period, if FDI takes place, the technology content of FDI, ΘSt = [θ0,t, θ1,t],
is determined by (11) and (12) with T S = T St−1. The aggregate production for multinational
firms is then determined according to (17) with XSt = χ(θ0,t, θ1,t, T
S
t−1). Given (19), note
that the stock of effective production experiences iterates according to:
QSt =
1
1 + δD
QSt−1 + δLX
S
t . (21)
The larger stock of effective production experiences at the end of period in turn implies a
higher level of technology frontier in the South T St by (20).
Thus, start from period t = 1, with zero amounts of prior FDI, QSt−1 = 0, and with the
South’s initial technology frontier at T S0 ∈ [1, θNS], the first wave ΘS1 of FDI takes place if the
risk sensitivity z is smaller than the ceiling z∗(T S0 ) as shown in Proposition 1. This implies
a current production of XS1 = χ(θ0,1, θ1,1, T
S
0 ), a stock of effective production experiences of
QS1 = δLX
S
1 , and a new higher level of technology frontier in the South T
S
1 .
In period t = 2, given the higher level of technology frontier in the South, the expected
profit of producing in the South increases for all firms θ ∈ [T S0 ,∞) previously constrained
by the risk factor. This triggers a second wave of FDI undertaken by a wider range of firms
ΘS2 ⊃ ΘS1 involving firms of both more and less sophisticated production technologies, as
indicated by Lemma 2. This dynamic process of FDI is illustrated in Figure 3. In the case
where T S0 > θNS, the dynamic process of FDI is similar except that the lower bound of the
technology content of inward FDI hits the risk-free cutoff level θNS immediately in the first
period and the expansion of the technology content of FDI is via the upper bound θ1 only.
Thus, the first wave of FDI by exposing the South to the more advanced production
technologies from the North helps the South to upgrade its technology frontier through
learning by doing and creates a less risky environment for subsequent FDI. The improved
condition in the South attracts a second wave of FDI and results in an enlarged production
base in the South, which in turn leads to a higher technology frontier in the South and a
new wave of FDI.
3.6 Steady State
We show that the above dynamic process of FDI is stationary and there exists at least
one stable steady state. We first specify the conditions that characterize a steady state.
In particular, in a given industry, the lower and upper bounds of the technology content
of FDI (θ0 and θ1), the aggregate scale of production of the South for multinational firms
(XS), the stock of effective production experiences (QS), and the South’s technology frontier
(T S) are constants at a steady state. Note that given (21), the stock of effective production
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experiences at a steady state can be solved as
QS = δXS, where δ = (1 + 1/δD) δL. (22)
We then substitute the above equation into (20) and the solutions implied by (11) and (12)
into (17). The steady state conditions can be summarized by the following two simultaneous
equations:
T S = T S0 + Γ
(
δXS
)
, (23)
XS = χ(θ0(T
S), θ1(T
S), T S). (24)
In the trivial case where FDI never takes off, the steady state is simply the status quo. Thus,
our discussion below focuses on the nontrivial case where z is sufficiently small such that
z < z∗(T S0 ). As a result, at a steady state, the South lifts its technology frontier up to a
higher stable level and secures a non-zero measure of FDI production.
Proposition 4 Suppose z < z∗(T S0 ). The dynamic process of FDI as described in Section 3.5
is stationary, and there exists at least one stable steady state.
We first characterize (24). If at a steady state, the South’s technology frontier T S were
at its initial level T S0 , then
XS = XS ≡ χ(θ0(T S0 ), θ1(T S0 ), T S0 ) > 0. (25)
Alternatively, if at a steady state, the South’s technology frontier T S were to approach
infinity, the aggregate scale of production of the South for multinational firms in an industry
would be equivalent to that in the risk-free case,
XS = X¯S ≡
∫ ∞
θNS
ΩSθνdG(θ) =
ΩSk
(k − ν) (θNS)
−(k−ν) . (26)
Furthermore, recall that XS increases in T S at a rate of Λ > 0 by Proposition 3. Thus,
the aggregate scale of production XS as a function of T S has a positive lower bound XS
if T S = T S0 . It increases in T
S and approaches X¯S from below as T S tends to infinity.
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4(a) by the PP schedule, where PP stands for
production.
Next, we characterize (23). Note that the level of technology frontier in the South T S
would stay at its initial level T S0 if zero FDI production took place (X
S = 0); it increases
monotonically in XS at a rate of δΓQ, and would reach an upper bound T¯
S ≡ T S0 + Γ(δX¯S)
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in the most optimistic scenario if all firms above the cutoff level θNS were to undertake FDI
as in the risk-free case. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4(a) by the LL schedule,
where LL stands for learning.
As the LL curve starts below the PP curve and ends up above it, the two curves must
cross at least once. In other words, there exists at least a steady-state equilibrium. If there
is only one steady state as illustrated in Figure 4(a), the steady state is also stable, because
if one starts from any alternative state, the two variables will adjust and converge toward
the crossover point I.
In general, there could be multiple steady states as illustrated in Figure 4(b), as we do
not specify a particular functional form for the learning function Γ(). The set of steady
states is a lattice. If we relabel the horizontal axis as T St−1 and the vertical axis as X
S
t ,
we could readily use Figure 4(b) to illustrate the dynamic process of FDI. Starting with the
initial technology frontier T S0 , the South’s production for multinational firms and the South’s
technology frontier grow (following the arrows) until they converge to the least element of
the lattice. That is, if there are multiple steady states, the South is trapped into the lowest
steady state with a relatively low level of inward FDI and a relatively low level of technology
frontier, instead of achieving the higher stable steady state(s). This has important policy
implications as we will discuss in Section 3.7.
Lemma 5 At a stable steady state, the following property holds,
δΓQΛ < 1. (27)
Proof of Lemma 5. At a stable steady state, the PP curve crosses the LL curve from above.
This is equivalent to state that dχ
dTS
<
[
dΓ
dXS
]−1
or dΓ
dXS
dχ
dTS
< 1. Note that dΓ
dXS
= δΓQ and
that dχ
dTS
= Λ. The result in (27) therefore follows.
Note that starting from a steady state, a unit positive disturbance to the technology
frontier in the South T S will lead to an increase in the production XS for multinational
firms by an amount Λ. For each unit increase in production for multinational firms, it has in
turn an effect on the technology frontier by an amount of δΓQ. Thus, the multiplier of the
technology frontier due to a unit shock equals δΓQΛ. Lemma 5 says that at a stable steady
state, the multiplier must be smaller than one, so that the economy will gyrate back toward its
initial state following a small disturbance to the endogenous variables. A multiplier smaller
than one also implies that the effect following a disturbance to the exogenous variables will
be finite. Given these qualities, we focus on stable steady states below.
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3.7 Comparative Static Analyses and Policy Implications
In this section, we work out the effect of changes to the model’s parameters on the steady-
state values of the endogenous variables. This part of analysis will serve as the basis for
our discussions of FDI policies that could be adopted by the South to influence the long-run
level of their development and the technology content of their inward FDI.
The analysis starts with the two equations (23) and (24) that characterize a steady state.
Let q denote one of the exogenous parameters (T S0 , δD, δL, w
S, fS, fN , z, ρ). First, take total
differentiation of (24) with respect to XS, T S and q; we have:
dXS
dq
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dq
, (28)
where Ξ ≡
(
∂χ
∂θ0
∂θ0
∂q
+ ∂χ
∂θ1
∂θ1
∂q
+ ∂χ
∂q
)
has the similar interpretation as Λ: the first two terms in-
dicate the extensive effect and the third term the intensive effect on the aggregate production
for multinational firms because of a change in the exogenous parameter q. The change in the
parameter q also affects the aggregate production for multinational firms indirectly through
its effect on the technology frontier, which in turn has its own intensive and extensive effects
on the aggregate production for multinational firms as summarized by Λ. Next, take total
differentiation of (23) with respect to XS, T S and q, and substitute dX
S
dq
with the expression
in (28); we get
dT S
dq
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂q
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂q
, (29)
where Σ ≡ 1− δΓQΛ. To see (29), note that following a shock to the exogenous parameter
q, the effects on the technology frontier could be threefold. First, a change in q has a
direct effect Ξ on the aggregate production for multinational firms, which in turn affects the
technology frontier by a rate δΓQ, and through the positive reinforcing feature of the dynamic
process, generates a multiple Σ−1 of the initial effect on the technology frontier. Second,
if the parameter q has a direct bearing on the stock of effective production experiences QS
through δ, it will affect the technology frontier by a rate XSΓQ and generate another layer
of multiplier effect on the technology frontier. Finally, the technology frontier can also be
altered through the initial technology frontier T S0 . Not all three channels are operating at any
one time. For parameters (wS, fS, fN , z, ρ), only the first channel is working; for (δD, δL),
only the second channel is working, and for T S0 , only the third channel is working.
We could further characterize the changes in the steady-state technology content of in-
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ward FDI, by taking total differentiation of (11) and (12) to obtain
dθ1
dq
=
∂θ1
∂q
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dq
, (30)
dθ0
dq
=
{
∂θ0
∂q
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dq
, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
∂θ0
∂q
, if θNS ≤ T S.
(31)
The upper and lower bounds for the technology content of inward FDI can be directly affected
by the exogenous parameter q if it appears in the profit functions; in addition, they will also
be indirectly affected through the change in the equilibrium technology frontier following a
change in q. In the case that the lower bound θ0 has already hit its lower limit θNS, the
indirect effect will cease to operate, as is implied by Lemma 2. Finally, it is also possible to
characterize the changes to the steady-state value of QS following a change in q, by taking
total differentiation of (22):
dQS
dq
= δ
dXS
dq
+XS
∂δ
∂q
, (32)
where the changes to the steady-state stock of effective production experiences occur mainly
through the changes to the equilibrium current production XS following a change in q, and
in addition, through a direct effect on QS for given XS if the parameter under study happens
to be δD or δL. In particular, it is straightforward to see that
∂δ
∂δD
< 0, ∂δ
∂δL
> 0, and ∂δ
∂q
= 0
otherwise.
Proposition 6 The following country characteristics of the South can be altered in a proper
direction to raise the equilibrium level of technology frontier in the South and the technology
content of inward FDI:
(i)
dTS
dTS0
> 0,
dXS
dTS0
> 0,
dQS
dTS0
> 0,
dθ1
dTS0
> 0,
dθ0
dTS0
≤ 0 with equality when θNS ≤ TS ;
(ii)
dTS
dδD
< 0,
dXS
dδD
< 0,
dQS
dδD
< 0,
dθ1
dδD
< 0,
dθ0
dδD
≥ 0 with equality when θNS ≤ TS ;
(iii)
dTS
dδL
> 0,
dXS
dδL
> 0,
dQS
dδL
> 0,
dθ1
dδL
> 0,
dθ0
dδL
≤ 0 with equality when θNS ≤ TS ;
(iv)
dTS
dwS
< 0,
dXS
dwS
< 0,
dQS
dwS
< 0,
dθ1
dwS
< 0,
dθ0
dwS
> 0;
(v)
dTS
dfS
< 0,
dXS
dfS
< 0,
dQS
dfS
< 0,
dθ1
dfS
< 0,
dθ0
dfS
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. Proof is provided in the appendix.
We discuss the policy implications of Proposition 6. As shown, the upper bound of the
technology content of FDI (θ1), the aggregate production for multinational firms (X
S), the
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stock of effective production experiences (QS), and the South’s technology frontier (T S)
at the steady state are positively correlated, while the lower bound (θ0) of the technology
content at the steady state moves in the oppositive direction if it is not already at its lowest
level θNS. This suggests that the South’s FDI policies could target different aspects of the
FDI dynamic mechanisms, (11), (12), (17), (20), and (21), and achieve similar effects of
enhancing the technology content of inward FDI.
The Southern government could aim at raising the South’s initial technology frontier
T S0 . As suggested by Proposition 1, a higher initial technology frontier in the South will
make FDI in the country more likely to take off in the first place. Furthermore, if a first
wave of FDI occurs, a higher initial technology frontier in the South will attract a wider
range of firms from the North, as indicated by Lemma 2, and hence a larger initial mass of
production for multinational firms. The larger initial mass of production generates a bigger
step forward by the South on the technology frontier and a steeper decline in the perceived
risk of FDI failure for all firms previously constrained by the technology frontier in the South,
and attracts a new wave of inward FDI. In every period, the stock of effective production
experiences is strictly higher in a Southern country with a higher initial technology frontier
than in one with a lower initial technology frontier, and hence, the learning effect of the
former is strictly higher than the latter. Coupled with its initial advantage, this implies that
the former country will have a higher steady state technology frontier than the latter. Thus,
a Southern country’s initial advantage in its technology frontier is persistent and is amplified
through the self-reinforcing dynamic process of FDI. The effect of T S0 on the steady-state
technology frontier in the South and the aggregate production for multinational firms is
illustrated in Figure 5(a).
Alternatively, the South may target improving the rate δ at which the South retains
knowledge from producing for inward FDI. As implied by the model, the higher the learning
speed δL and the lower the depreciation rate δD, the more effective is the Southern work force
in acquiring and preserving FDI production experience that is the driving force of improving
its own technology frontier. This policy target in reality could be implemented by education
policies that improve the general human capital of the work force and its absorptive capacity.
As discussed earlier, if there are multiple steady states, the South is trapped into the lowest
steady state with a relatively low level of technology frontier. A FDI policy by the South
thus could affect its steady-state technology frontier in an industry by working around the
neighborhood of the lowest steady state, or more importantly, it could actually pull the South
out of the lowest steady state toward one of the higher steady state(s). This possibility
of a quantum leap in development by the South because of adjustment in key economic
parameters is illustrated in Figure 5(b) for either an increase in δL or a decrease in δD, where
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by heightening the speed of knowledge accumulation and of technology improvement, the
South could actually escape the potential development trap and grows until it reaches the
region of the highest steady state.
Last but not least, policies to reduce the marginal labor cost wS or the fixed setup cost
fS of conducting FDI have often been used in practice by the South. The lower marginal
labor cost or fixed setup cost of producing in the South will in the first instance increase the
upper bound and lower the lower bound of the FDI technology content, and hence increase
the amount of inward FDI. In addition to attracting a wider range of firms from the North
(an extensive effect), a reduction in wS also stimulates more production by all existing FDI
(an intensive effect; see (8)) and induces an even larger increase in the aggregate production
for multinational firms than a mere reduction in fS. The stimulus to the FDI production
has often been cited as the rationale for such FDI subsidy policies. The new insights gained
from the current model are that the increased amount of inward FDI will in turn increase
the exposure of the South to a larger amount of advanced production technologies from the
North, bring forward more learning and technology spillover from the North, and improve the
South’s technology frontier. The latter will in turn lower the FDI uncertainty and attract
further flows of inward FDI. The effects of such policies on the South’s development are
illustrated in Figure 5(c) for a decrease in wS and Figure 5(d) for a decrease in fS. It is
arguable that fS is determined to a large extent by industry characteristics and vary across
industries. In this view, the proposition implies that an industry that has a lower setup
cost to produce also tends to be more footloose and its production technology more readily
spread from the North to the South.
Proposition 7 The North may adopt defensive policies regarding fN to prevent its high-
technology firms from relocating their production facilities to the South:3
(i)
dTS
dfN
> 0,
dXS
dfN
> 0,
dQS
dfN
> 0,
dθ1
dfN
> 0,
dθ0
dfN
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Proof is provided in the appendix.
As argued earlier, the fixed setup cost can have both industry and country-specific con-
tents, with the latter amenable to potential policy interventions. In the case of fN , the North
may subsidize firms to lower their fixed operation cost in the North fN . The effects would be
to weaken firms’ incentives to produce in the South and to mitigate the dynamic reinforcing
3The effects of the Northern wage wN on the endogenous variables do not have definite signs, in contrast
with wS , as wN affects not only the variable profits of operating in the North but also the fixed setup costs
in both locations in the current setup. In general, a Northern government may devise schemes to subsidize
only the variable costs of operating in the North, countering the FDI incentive created by the lower wage in
the South.
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process of production migration. At the steady state, more higher-technology firms remain
in the North and the South achieves a smaller technology progress in the industry affected.
The results are exactly opposite to what is illustrated in Figure 5(d).
Proposition 8 The FDI patterns and technology contents across industries depend on the
following industry characteristics as follows:
(i)
dTS
dz
< 0,
dXS
dz
< 0,
dQS
dz
< 0,
dθ1
dz
< 0,
dθ0
dz
≥ 0 with equality when θNS ≤ TS ;
(ii)
dTS
dρ
< 0,
dXS
dρ
< 0,
dQS
dρ
< 0,
dθ1
dρ
< 0,
dθ0
dρ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Proof is provided in the appendix.4
Although not within the South’s control to a large extent, the above technology param-
eters or industry characteristics, z and ρ, have important effects on the South’s industry-
specific development. A lower degree of risk sensitivity z to technology gap, by raising the
success rate of FDI, raises the expected profit of producing in the South for all firms con-
strained by the South’s technology frontier, increases the upper bound of the technology
content of inward FDI and lowers the lower bound if it is not already at its lower limit θNS.
This corresponds to a larger amount of inward FDI (an extensive effect). A lower degree of
risk sensitivity z, by raising the success rate of FDI, also induces a larger amount of produc-
tion by all existing FDI (an intensive effect; see (8)). Both effects lead to a bigger production
of the South for multinational firms in the industry. This, in turn, leads to a larger stock
of effective production experiences and a higher level of technology frontier in the industry
of the South. The positive effect of a lower degree of risk sensitivity z on the steady-state
technology frontier in the industry of the South is illustrated in Figure 5(c).
The technology parameter ρ specifying the elasticity of substitution 1
1−ρ between inter-
mediate steps of production affects negatively the unit cost of production (3), the profit-
maximizing output level, and hence the profit level. In particular, if the different interme-
diate steps of production are more substitutable, it takes more intensive labor input in each
step to produce a given amount of output; this leads to a higher level of unit cost and a
lower level of output and profit ceteris paribus. The negative impact is larger if the initial
production scale is larger. For firms that have chosen to produce in the South, their output
levels will be affected more negatively by an increase in ρ than if they produced in the North,
as these firms produce more in the South than they would in the North (firms that choose to
produce in the South must have a higher level of variable profit and hence output producing
4It is also shown in the appendix that the effects of the demand elasticity α and the inverse dispersion
measure of firms’ technology levels k do not have definite signs.
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in the South than they would in the North, so as to offset, at least, the higher setup cost
of FDI). Thus, an increase in ρ and the elasticity of substitution between intermediate steps
will discourage marginal firms from producing in the South, lowering the upper bound and
increasing the lower bound of FDI technology content, and reduce the amount of inward
FDI. On top of this negative extensive effect, all existing FDI’s output also decreases (a
negative intensive effect) in response to a higher ρ. Thus, overall, the aggregate production
of the South for multinational firms in the industry is lower, which eventually leads to a
lower level of technology frontier in the industry of the South. Figure 5(c) illustrates the
opposite scenario of a decrease in ρ.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the risk of quality control failure and the stronger negative incentives it
implies for higher-technology firms to undertake FDI in a relative backward South. This leads
to a non-monotonic relationship between firms’ performance measures and their propensity
to carry out FDI, which is a departure from the literature, and an upper bound on the
technology content of FDI, which provides a better description of the reality and more
reasonable policy implications. The same risk consideration also implies an endogenous
threshold on a Southern country’s technology frontier that must be met before it will attract
any inward FDI.
We further model the South’s endogenous upgrading of its technology frontier through
learning by producing for multinational firms. We show how the risk condition facing poten-
tial FDI entrants from the North improves endogenously as the host country’s technology
capacity strengthens. This implies a self-reinforcing FDI dynamic process, where the effects
of the South’s initial condition on the FDI stock, the technology content of FDI, and the
South’s technology frontier tend to be magnified at the steady state. The aforementioned
threshold effect and agglomeration phenomenon have often been documented in empirics for
FDI flows in specific industries or regions. However, to the best of our knowledge, they are
first formalized in our paper.
The analytical framework presented thus suggests many relevant mechanisms which a
Southern country may target to raise its long-run development level via exposure to FDI.
These include improving its learning speed or absorptive capacity in transforming the tech-
nology content of FDI to its own knowledge stock for given amounts of FDI inflows, creating
stronger cost incentives to increase the amount of FDI inflows in given industries, and ad-
dressing heterogeneities across industries in terms of risk sensitivity or input substitution.
Many of these mechanisms have been explored in empirical studies or analyzed separately in
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different theoretical models. We present an overarching theory that encompasses these im-
portant aspects and clarifies the specific theoretical channels through which each potentially
policy-dependent variable works to affect the incentives of FDI. Such structural dynamic
frameworks were often lacking in previous empirical studies. The analysis of the risk factor
in relation to production technology and its impact on the technology content of FDI in our
framework also opens up a new area of research that has not received much attention by
past empirical studies.
5. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show the existence and uniqueness of z∗(T S) for given T S ∈
[1, θNS). The proof is equivalent to show that there exists a unique z
∗ such that p˜iS(θ˜; T˜ S, z)
is tangent to p˜iN(θ˜). Let θ˜† define the technology level where the two profit functions have
the same slope. It follows that
θ˜†(T˜ S, z) =
[(
1− z
να(1− α)
)
ψS
ψN
] να(1−α)
z
T˜ S. (33)
Note that θ˜† exists (which implies θ˜† > T˜ S) and is bounded if and only if 0 < z < z¯, where
z¯ ≡
(
1− ψN
ψS
)
να(1 − α). Let φ(T˜ S, z) denote the distance between p˜iS(θ˜; T˜ S, z) and p˜iN(θ˜)
at the technology level θ˜†; we have:
φ(T˜ S, z) = ψN θ˜†(T˜ S, z)/g(z)− wN(fS − fN), (34)
where g(z) ≡ να(1−α)
z
− 1. Note that for T˜ S ∈ [1, θ˜NS) and z ∈ (0, z¯),
∂φ(T˜ S, z)
∂z
< 0, lim
z→0
φ(T˜ S, z)→∞, lim
z→z¯
φ(T˜ S, z) = T˜ S
(
ψS − ψN)− wN(fS − fN) < 0, (35)
where the first limit follows by applying the L’Hospital’s Rule to θ˜† and g(z), and the sign
of the second limit follows by the fact that p˜iS(θ˜; T˜ S, z) is strictly dominated by p˜iN(θ˜) at
θ˜ = T˜ S < θ˜NS. Thus, by the fixed point theory, it follows that there exists a unique
z∗ ∈ (0, z¯), such that
φ(T˜ S, z∗) = 0, (36)
and that p˜iS is tangent to p˜iN . For z < z∗, it follows that φ(T˜ S, z) > 0 and as a result, positive
amounts of FDI take place. For T S = θNS, the South profit function will lie everywhere below
the North profit function with overlapping only at θNS, when z ≥ z¯. In other words, if and
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only if z < z¯, will the South profit function rise above the North profit function to the right
of T S = θNS so that a positive measure of firms undertake FDI. Thus, z
∗(θNS) = z¯. For
T S ∈ (θNS,∞), the South profit function lies strictly above the North profit function at least
for θ ∈ (θNS, T S + ], where  > 0, so FDI occurs regardless of z.
We then show the existence and uniqueness of T S∗(z) for all z. From the above, we know
that z∗(1) is the cap of the risk sensitivity when the South’s technology frontier is at the
lowest level, i.e. T S = 1. For z below the cap z∗(1), FDI takes place necessarily, which is
equivalent to say that T S∗(z) = 1 for z ∈ [0, z∗(1)]. For sufficiently large degrees of risk
sensitivity such that z¯ ≤ z, the South profit function is flatter than the North profit function
for all θ > T S; thus, FDI will take place if and only if the technology frontier exceeds the
risk-free cutoff level θNS, so T
S∗(z) = θNS for z¯ ≤ z. For z ∈ (z∗(1), z¯), to show the existence
of a unique T S∗(z) is again equivalent to show the existence of a unique technology frontier
level T S∗ ∈ (1, θNS) such that p˜iS is tangent to p˜iN , or equivalently, that
φ(T˜ S∗, z) = 0. (37)
One can verify that for T˜ S ∈ (1, θ˜NS) and z ∈ (z∗(1), z¯),
∂φ(T˜ S, z)
∂T˜ S
> 0, lim
T˜S→1
φ(T˜ S, z) < 0, lim
T˜S→θ˜NS
φ(T˜ S, z) > 0. (38)
The sign of the first limit is implied by the fact that φ(1, z∗(1)) = 0 and ∂φ(1,z)
∂z
< 0. To obtain
the sign of the second limit, note that φ(T˜ S, z) is the unique maximum of p˜iS(θ˜; T˜ S, z)−p˜iN(θ˜).
As p˜iS(θ˜; T˜ S, z)−p˜iN(θ˜) = 0 at θ˜ = T˜ S = θ˜NS and θ˜† > T˜ S, the sign of the second limit follows.
Thus, by the fixed point theory, there exists a unique T˜ S∗ ∈ (1, θ˜NS) for z ∈ (z∗(1), z¯), such
that (37) is satisfied.
To show the relationship between T S∗ and z, take the total differentiation of (37) to
obtain
dT˜ S∗
dz
= −
∂φ(T˜S ,z)
∂z
∂φ(T˜S ,z)
∂T˜S
∣∣∣∣∣
T˜S=T˜S∗
> 0.
It follows that dT S∗/dz =
(
dT˜ S∗/dz
)(
dT S∗/dT˜ S∗
)
> 0 for z ∈ (z∗(1), z¯). It is obvious that
dT S∗/dz = 0 for z ∈ [0, z∗(1)] and for z ≥ z¯.
Proof of Propositions 6–8. To determine the signs of (28)–(32), first note that Σ > 0 holds
at a stable steady state. Also recall the signs for the critical elements Λ > 0 and ΓQ > 0, as
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well as those for ∂θ1
∂TS
and ∂θ0
∂TS
from Lemma 2. Finally, note that based on the definition for
the technology content of inward FDI, (11)–(12), it follows that
∂θ1
∂q
≡ [piNθ (θ1)− piSθ (θ1)]−1 [piSq (θ1)− piNq (θ1)] , (39)
∂θ0
∂q
≡
{ [
piNθ (θ0)− piSθ (θ0)
]−1 [
piSq (θ0)− piNq (θ0)
]
, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,[
piNθ (θNS)− piSθ (θNS)
]−1 [
piSq (θNS)− piNq (θNS)
]
, if θNS ≤ T S.
(40)
where pilq ≡ ∂pi
l
∂q
for l ∈ {N,S}. Recall that ∂χ
∂θ0
< 0 and ∂χ
∂θ1
> 0. Thus, to determine the
sign of Ξ, it remains to show the signs of the derivatives ∂θ1
∂q
, ∂θ0
∂q
, and ∂χ
∂q
, using the profit
functions (9)–(10), and the FDI aggregate production function (17), for each parameter. We
show the detailed derivations below.
For each parameter q ∈ {T S0 , δD, δL, wS, fS, fN , z, ρ, wN , k, α}, we first show the signs of
∂θ1
∂q
, ∂θ0
∂q
, and ∂χ
∂q
, based on (9), (10), and (17), as well as (39) and (40). The results will help
determine the sign of Ξ. Given the signs of Ξ, ∂θ1
∂q
, and ∂θ0
∂q
, the signs of the comparative
statics for (28)–(32) then follow straightforwardly.
(i) q = T S0 : As the parameter T
S
0 does not appear in the profit functions (9) and (10), and
the aggregate production function (17), it follows that ∂θ1
∂TS0
= 0, ∂θ0
∂TS0
= 0, and ∂χ
∂TS0
= 0.
Thus, Ξ = 	0 +⊕0 + 0 = 0, and
dT S
dT S0
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂T S0
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂T S0
= ⊕0 +⊕0 + Σ−1 > 0
dXS
dT S0
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dT S0
= 0 +⊕⊕ > 0
dQS
dT S0
= δ
dXS
dT S0
+XS
∂δ
∂T S0
= ⊕⊕+⊕ 0 > 0
dθ1
dT S0
=
∂θ1
∂T S0
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dT S0
= 0 +⊕⊕ > 0
dθ0
dT S0
=
{
∂θ0
∂TS0
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dTS0
= 0 +	⊕ < 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂TS0
= 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(ii) q = δD:
As the parameter δD does not appear in the profit functions (9) and (10), and the
aggregate production function (17), it follows that ∂θ1
∂δD
= 0, ∂θ0
∂δD
= 0, and ∂χ
∂δD
= 0.
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Thus, Ξ = 	0 +⊕0 + 0 = 0, and
dT S
dδD
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂δD
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂δD
= ⊕0 +⊕	+⊕ 0 < 0
dXS
dδD
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dδD
= 0 +⊕	 < 0
dQS
dδD
= δ
dXS
dδD
+XS
∂δ
∂δD
= ⊕	+⊕	 < 0
dθ1
dδD
=
∂θ1
∂δD
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dδD
= 0 +⊕	 < 0
dθ0
dδD
=
{
∂θ0
∂δD
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dδD
= 0 +		 > 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂δD
= 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(iii) q = δL:
As the parameter δL does not appear in the profit functions (9) and (10), and the
aggregate production function (17), it follows that ∂θ1
∂δL
= 0, ∂θ0
∂δL
= 0, and ∂χ
∂δL
= 0.
Thus, Ξ = 	0 +⊕0 + 0 = 0, and
dT S
dδL
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂δL
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂δL
= ⊕0 +⊕⊕+⊕ 0 > 0
dXS
dδL
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dδL
= 0 +⊕⊕ > 0
dQS
dδL
= δ
dXS
dδL
+XS
∂δ
∂δL
= ⊕⊕+⊕⊕ > 0
dθ1
dδL
=
∂θ1
∂δL
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dδL
= 0 +⊕⊕ > 0
dθ0
dδL
=
{
∂θ0
∂δL
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dδL
= 0 +	⊕ < 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂δL
= 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(iv) q = wS:
Using (9) and (10), note that
piSwS(θ)− piNwS(θ) =
∂ψS
∂wS
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α < 0, for T S < θ,
piSwS(θ)− piNwS(θ) =
∂ψS
∂wS
θνα < 0, for θ ≤ T S.
Plug the above signs into (39) and (40); it follows that ∂θ1
∂wS
< 0 and ∂θ0
∂wS
> 0. Next,
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using (17), note that
∂χ
∂wS
=
∂ΩS
∂wS
χ
ΩS
< 0,
as ∂Ω
S
∂wS
< 0. As a result, Ξ = 	⊕+⊕	+	 < 0, and
dT S
dwS
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂wS
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂wS
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 +⊕0 < 0
dXS
dwS
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dwS
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dQS
dwS
= δ
dXS
dwS
+XS
∂δ
∂wS
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 < 0
dθ1
dwS
=
∂θ1
∂wS
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dwS
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dθ0
dwS
=
{
∂θ0
∂wS
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dwS
= ⊕+		 > 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂wS
> 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(v) q = fS:
Using (9) and (10), note that
piSfS(θ)− piNfS(θ) = −wN < 0.
Plug the above signs into (39) and (40); it follows that ∂θ1
∂fS
< 0 and ∂θ0
∂fS
> 0. Further-
more, note that ∂χ
∂fS
= 0. Thus, Ξ = 	⊕+⊕	+ 0 < 0, and
dT S
dfS
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂fS
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂fS
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 +⊕0 < 0
dXS
dfS
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dfS
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dQS
dfS
= δ
dXS
dfS
+XS
∂δ
∂fS
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 < 0
dθ1
dfS
=
∂θ1
∂fS
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dfS
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dθ0
dfS
=
{
∂θ0
∂fS
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dfS
= ⊕+		 > 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂fS
> 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(vi) q = fN :
Using (9) and (10), note that
piSfN (θ)− piNfN (θ) = wN > 0.
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Plug the above signs into (39) and (40); it follows that ∂θ1
∂fN
> 0 and ∂θ0
∂fN
< 0. Note as
well that ∂χ
∂fN
= 0. Thus, Ξ = 		+⊕⊕+ 0 > 0, and
dT S
dfN
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂fN
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂fN
= ⊕⊕+⊕ 0 +⊕0 > 0
dXS
dfN
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dfN
= ⊕+⊕⊕ > 0
dQS
dfN
= δ
dXS
dfN
+XS
∂δ
∂fN
= ⊕⊕+⊕ 0 > 0
dθ1
dfN
=
∂θ1
∂fN
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dfN
= ⊕+⊕⊕ > 0
dθ0
dfN
=
{
∂θ0
∂fN
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dfN
= 	+	⊕ < 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂fN
< 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(vii) q = z:
Using (9) and (10), note that
piSz (θ)− piNz (θ) =
1
1− αψ
S
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α (lnT S − ln θ) < 0, for T S < θ,
piSz (θ)− piNz (θ) = 0, for θ ≤ T S.
Plug the above signs into (39) and (40); it follows that ∂θ1
∂z
< 0, while ∂θ0
∂z
> 0 if
1 ≤ T S < θNS and ∂θ0∂z = 0 if θNS ≤ T S. Next, using (17), note that if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
∂χ
∂z
= − 1
1− α
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [J(θ0)− J(θ1)],
where J(θ) ≡
(
1
a
− ln TS
θ
)
θ−a, which is flat at θ = T S and everywhere decreasing for
θ > T S ≥ 1. In the current case, T S < θ0 < θ1, it follows that J(θ0) − J(θ1) > 0 and
∂χ
∂z
< 0. Alternatively, if T S ≥ θNS,
∂χ
∂z
= − 1
1− α
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [J(T S)− J(θ1)].
Given the property of J(θ) and that T S < θ1, it follows that
∂χ
∂z
< 0 in this case as
well. Hence, Ξ = 	⊕+⊕	+	 < 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS, and Ξ = 	0 +⊕	+	 < 0, if
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θNS ≤ T S as well. As a result,
dT S
dz
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂z
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂z
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 +⊕0 < 0
dXS
dz
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dz
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dQS
dz
= δ
dXS
dz
+XS
∂δ
∂z
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 < 0
dθ1
dz
=
∂θ1
∂z
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dz
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dθ0
dz
=
{
∂θ0
∂z
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dz
= ⊕+		 > 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂z
= 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(viii) q = ρ:
Using (9) and (10), note that
piSρ (θ)− piNρ (θ) = α
∂ν
∂ρ
[
ψS
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α − ψNθνα
]
ln θ, for T S < θ,
= α
∂ν
∂ρ
[
wN(fS − fN)] ln θ < 0, for T S < θ = {θ0, θ1},
piSρ (θ)− piNρ (θ) = α
∂ν
∂ρ
[
ψSθνα − ψNθνα] ln θ < 0, for θ ≤ T S
where we have used the fact that ∂ν
∂ρ
< 0. Plug the above signs into (39) and (40); it
follows that ∂θ1
∂ρ
< 0, and ∂θ0
∂ρ
> 0. Next, note that if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
∂χ
∂ρ
= −∂a
∂ρ
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [Jˆ(θ0, a)− Jˆ(θ1, a)]
where ∂a
∂ρ
> 0 and Jˆ(θ, r) ≡ (1
r
+ ln θ
)
θ−r, which is a decreasing function of θ, for any
r > 0 and θ > 1. Note that in the current case, 1 ≤ T S < θ0 < θ1, it follows that
Jˆ(θ0, a)− Jˆ(θ1, a) > 0 and ∂χ∂ρ < 0. Alternatively, if T S ≥ θNS,
∂χ
∂ρ
= − ∂(k − ν)
∂ρ
ΩSk
(k − ν) [Jˆ(θ0, k − ν)− Jˆ(T
S, k − ν)]
− ∂a
∂ρ
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [Jˆ(T S, a)− Jˆ(θ1, a)].
Note that ∂(k−ν)
∂ρ
> 0. Given the property of Jˆ(θ, r) and that θ0 ≤ T S < θ1 in this case,
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it follows that ∂χ
∂ρ
< 0. As a result, Ξ = 	⊕+⊕	+	 < 0, and
dT S
dρ
= Σ−1δΓQΞ + Σ−1XSΓQ
∂δ
∂ρ
+ Σ−1
∂T S0
∂ρ
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 +⊕0 < 0
dXS
dρ
= Ξ + Λ
dT S
dρ
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dQS
dρ
= δ
dXS
dρ
+XS
∂δ
∂ρ
= ⊕	+⊕ 0 < 0
dθ1
dρ
=
∂θ1
∂ρ
+
∂θ1
∂T S
dT S
dρ
= 	+⊕	 < 0
dθ0
dρ
=
{
∂θ0
∂ρ
+ ∂θ0
∂TS
dTS
dρ
= ⊕+		 > 0, if 1 ≤ T S < θNS
∂θ0
∂ρ
> 0, if θNS ≤ T S
(ix) q = wN : “Not for Publication”
Note that
piSwN (θ)− piNwN (θ) = −fS −
∂ψN
∂wN
θνα + fN ,
whose sign is not definite. Thus, it follows that ∂θ1
∂wN
and ∂θ0
∂wN
do not have definite signs,
and so does Ξ and the rest of the comparative statics.
(x) q = k: “Not for Publication”
The parameter k does not appear in the profit functions (9) and (10); thus, ∂θ1
∂k
= 0
and ∂θ0
∂k
= 0. Next, using (17), note that
∂χ
∂k
=

ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α
[(
1
k
− 1
a
− ln θ0
)
(θ0)
−a − ( 1
k
− 1
a
− ln θ1
)
(θ1)
−a] , if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
ΩSk
(k−ν)
[(
1
k
− 1
k−ν − ln θ0
)
(θ0)
−(k−ν) − ( 1
k
− 1
k−ν − lnT S
) (
T S
)−(k−ν)]
+ Ω
Sk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α
[(
1
k
− 1
a
− lnT S) (T S)−a − ( 1
k
− 1
a
− ln θ1
)
(θ1)
−a
]
, if θNS ≤ T S,
whose sign is not definitive, but can be shown to depend on the sign of ( 1
k
− ln θ), i.e.,
the level of k and the range of FDI. The above results imply that the sign of Ξ is not
definitive and so are the signs of the comparative statics.
(xi) q = α: “Not for Publication”
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Note that ∂ψ
l
∂α
= 1
(1−α)2 ln
(
α
wl
)
ψl. Using (9) and (10), note that for T S < θ,
piSα(θ)− piNα (θ) =
1
(1− α)2
[
ln
( α
wS
)
ψS
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α − ln
( α
wN
)
ψNθνα
]
+
1− ρ
ρ
1
(1− α)2
[
ψS
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α − ψNθνα
]
ln θ
+
z
(1− α)2
[
ψS
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α
] [
lnT S − ln θ] ,
=
1
(1− α)2ψ
Nθνα
[
ln
(
wN
wS
)
+ z
(
lnT S − ln θ)]
+
1
(1− α)2w
N
(
fS − fN) [(1− ρ
ρ
)
ln θ + ln
( α
wS
)
+ z
(
lnT S − ln θ)] ,
for T S < θ = {θ0, θ1},
where to get the second equality, we have used the fact that ψS
(
T S
) z
1−α θνα−
z
1−α =
ψNθνα +wN
(
fS − fN) at θ = {θ0, θ1}, as profits of producing in the South and in the
North are the same at these two technology levels. Use the definition of xN(θ) and
xS(θ) for T S < θ, it follows that piSα(θ) − piNα (θ) =
(
xN(θ)
)α (
lnxS(θ)− lnxN(θ)) +
1
(1−α)w
N(fS − fN) (lnxS(θ)) at T S < θ = {θ0, θ1}, where (lnxS(θ)− lnxN(θ)) > 0 at
θ = {θ0, θ1}, but the sign of
(
lnxS(θ)
)
depends on the parameters.
Alternatively, for θ ≤ T S, based on similar manipulations, we can show that
piSα(θ)− piNα (θ) =
1
(1− α)2
[
ln
( α
wS
)
ψSθνα − ln
( α
wN
)
ψNθνα
]
+
1− ρ
ρ
1
(1− α)2
[
ψSθνα − ψNθνα] ln θ
=
1
(1− α)2ψ
Nθνα
[
ln
(
wN
wS
)]
+
1
(1− α)2w
N
(
fS − fN) [(1− ρ
ρ
)
ln θ + ln
( α
wS
)]
,
for θ = {θ0} ≤ T S,
Again, use the definition of xN(θ) and xS(θ) for θ ≤ T S, it follows that piSα(θ)−piNα (θ) =(
xN(θ)
)α (
lnxS(θ)− lnxN(θ))+ 1
(1−α)w
N(fS−fN) (lnxS(θ)) at θ = {θ0} ≤ T S. Thus,
the sign of piSα(θ)− piNα (θ) again depends on the parameters.
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Next, note that if 1 ≤ T S < θNS,
∂χ
∂α
= − ∂a
∂α
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [Jˆ(θ0, a)− Jˆ(θ1, a)]
+
1
(1− α)
[
1
α
+ ln ΩS + ln
(
T S
) z
1−α
]
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [(θ0)
−a − (θ1)−a],
where the first term is positive, given that ∂a
∂α
< 0 and the property of Jˆ(θ, r); the sign
of the second term depends on the sign of
[
1
α
+ ln ΩS + ln
(
T S
) z
1−α
]
, which depends on
the parameters. Alternatively, if T S ≥ θNS,
∂χ
∂α
= − ∂(k − ν)
∂α
ΩSk
(k − ν) [Jˆ(θ0, k − ν)− Jˆ(T
S, k − ν)]
− ∂a
∂α
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [Jˆ(T S, a)− Jˆ(θ1, a)]
+
1
(1− α)
[
1
α
+ ln ΩS
]
ΩSk
(k − ν) [(θ0)
−(k−ν) − (θ1)−(k−ν)]
+
1
(1− α)
[
1
α
+ ln ΩS + ln
(
T S
) z
1−α
]
ΩSk
a
(
T S
) z
1−α [
(
T S
)−a − (θ1)−a],
where the first and the second terms are positive given that ∂(k−ν)
∂α
< 0 and the property
of Jˆ(θ, r); the signs of the third and fourth terms again depend on the parameters.
Thus, it follows that ∂θ1
∂α
, ∂θ0
∂α
, and ∂χ
∂α
do not have definite signs, and so does Ξ and the
rest of the comparative statics.
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Figure 1: Expected Profits of FDI versus Production in the North
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Figure 2: Threshold Technology Frontier For Inward FDI
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Figure 3: Dynamics of FDI
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Figure 4: Existence and Stability of Steady State
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(b) Multiple Equilibrium
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Figure 5: Comparative Static Analysis
(a) TS0 < T
S′
0
-
6
TS
XS
...............................................................L
............................................................ ..............................X¯S
P
I’
XS
′
.......................
TS
′
0T
S
0
- -
T¯S T¯S
′0
XS
I
L′
L′L
P
5
(b) δ < δ′
-
6
TS
XS
.............
I’
........
...........................................................................................
XS
X¯S
0
TS0 T¯
S
I: development trap
I’: development jump
T¯S
′
-
L′
..............................................................
P
L
L L′
P
I
6
41
Figure 5: Comparative Static Analysis Continued
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